Excellence by Nonsense: The Competition for Publications in Modern Science by Mathias Binswanger
Excellence by Nonsense: The Competition
for Publications in Modern Science
Mathias Binswanger
Most scientific publications are utterly redundant, mere
quantitative ‘productivity’.
—Gerhard Fröhlich
Abstract In this chapter, Binswanger (a critic of the current scientific process)
explains how artificially staged competitions affect science and how they result in
nonsense. An economist himself, Binswanger provides examples from his field and
shows how impact factors and publication pressure reduce the quality of scientific
publications. Some might know his work and arguments from his book ‘Sinnlose
Wettbewerbe’.
In Search of Excellence
Since the Age of Enlightenment, science has mostly taken place at universities and
their respective institutes, where for a long time the ideal of uniting research and
teaching was upheld. Since their re-establishment by Humboldt in 1810, German
universities have been, also in terms of academic work, largely independent and
the principle of academic freedom was applied.
The government merely determined that amount of money that was paid to
universities and set the legal framework for science and teaching. In terms of
research, the government did not impose specific research policies-with the
exception of some inglorious episodes (e.g. the Nazi regime). Universities were
trusted to know best what kind of research they were doing.
Generally, it was accepted not to tell a country’s best academics what they
should be interested in and what research they should be doing (Schatz 2001;
Kohler 2007). Therefore, the academic practice of professors and other scientists
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was hardly documented and assessed systematically, as it was assumed that aca-
demics would strive for excellence without having to be forced to do so.
Sometimes this was right and sometimes it was wrong. Huge differences in
quality between individual scientists were the result. Scientific geniuses and lame
ducks jointly populated universities, whereby even during the scientists’ lifetimes
it was not always discernible who was the lame duck and who the genius.
The extraordinary is the rare result of average science and only broad quality,
growing out from mediocrity, brings the great achievement at the end says Jürgen
Mittelstrass, philosopher of science (2007). Still in 1945, the then president of
Harvard University wrote in a letter addressed to the New York Times (August,
13th, 1945): There is only one method to guarantee progress in science. One has to
find geniuses, support them and let them carry out their work independently.
Meanwhile, the government has given up its reservations towards universities
and formerly proud bastions of independent thinking have turned into servants of
governmental programs and initiatives. Lenin’s doctrine applies once again: trust
is good, control is better.
To ensure the efficient use of scarce funds, the government forces universities
and professors, together with their academic staff, to permanently take part in
artificially staged competitions. This is happening on two fronts: universities have
to prove themselves by competing, both in terms of education and scientific
research, in order to stay ahead in the rankings. Yet how did this development
occur? Why did successful and independent universities forget about their noble
purpose of increasing knowledge and instead degenerated into ‘‘publication fac-
tories’’ and ‘‘project mills’’ which are only interested in their rankings?
To understand this, we have to take a closer look at the development of uni-
versities since the 1960s. Until then, people with a tertiary education made up a
relatively small fraction of the population. Universities were relatively elitist
institutions which remained out of reach for the majority of working class kids.
Since the 1960s however, increasing access to tertiary education occurred, for
which the term ‘mass higher education’ (Trow 1997) was coined.
From 1950, first-year student rates increased from an average of 5 % in the
industrialized countries to up to 50 % at the beginning of the 21st century
(Switzerland, with its 20 %, is an exception). Universities and politics, however,
were not prepared to deal with this enormous increase. It was believed to be
possible to carry on with 1,000 students in the same way as has been done with 50
students, by just increasing the number of universities and professors and by
putting more money into administration.
The mass education at universities made a farce of Humboldt’s old idea of unity
of research and education. This had consequences for both education and research.
There were more and more students and also more and more researchers who were
employed at universities (and later on at universities of applied sciences), but most
of them no longer had any time for research. In Germany, the number of students
also grew disproportionately faster than the number of professors due to the very
generous government support of students through BAFÖG (Federal Education and
Trainings Assistance Act). Therefore, one professor had to supervise more and
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more students and postgraduates and there was no more time to seriously deal with
them.
Dissertations became mass products, the majority of which added little or
nothing to scientific advancement. An environment emerged that was neither
stimulating for professors, nor for their assistants and doctoral students, which
logically led to increasing mediocrity. German universities in particular have often
been criticized along the following lines: studies last too long, the dropout rates are
too high, the curricula are obsolete, and research performance is only average and
rarely of value and relevance for industrial innovations.
A second phenomenon which did a lot of harm to the European universities,
was the lasting glorification of the American higher education system. Many
politicians, but also scientists themselves, see this system as a permanent source of
excellence and success without—as US scientist Trow (1997) writes—getting the
general picture of the American higher education system. Attention is directed
exclusively at Harvard, Princeton, Yale, MIT, and other Ivy-League universities,
which make up only a small percentage of the university landscape in the US. In
this euphoria, it is intentionally overlooked that the majority of colleges and
universities displays an intellectually modest standard and hardly contributes to
academic progress. Much of what we celebrate as ‘globalization’ and ‘adjustment
to international standards’ is in reality the adjustment to US-American provin-
cialism (Fröhlich 2006).
In Europe, the idea became fashionable that imitating top US universities would
magically create a new academic elite. Like small boys, all universities wanted to
be the greatest, and politics started propagating sponsorship of Ivy-League uni-
versities, elite institutions, and elite scientists. Germany started an Excellence
Initiative in order to boost its international competitiveness. Switzerland aimed to
be one of the top 5 countries for innovation by supporting excellence, and the
European Union, with the so-called Lisbon-strategy of 2000, hoped to turn the EU
into the most dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010.
Cutting-edge universities, top-institutes, and research clusters shot up every-
where, and everyone wanted to be even more excellent than their already-excellent
competitors. Amongst this childish race for excellence, it was overlooked that not
all can be more excellent than the rest. This fallacy of composition applies here as
well. Instead, the term ‘excellence’ became a meaningless catchword. Philosopher
Mittelstrass (2007) writes:
Until now, no one took offence at the labeling of excellent cuisine, excellent performance,
excellent academics or excellent scientists. […] In the case of science this changed since
science policy has occupied this term and talks about excellent research, excellent research
establishments, clusters of excellence and Excellence Initiatives, in endless and almost
unbearable repetitions.
Yet how do we actually know what excellence is and where it is worthwhile to
foster a scientific elite? In reality, no one actually knows, least of all the politicians
who enthusiastically launch such excellence initiatives. This is where the idea of
artificially staged competition comes in. It is assumed that these competitions will
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automatically make the best rise to the top—without the need to care about neither
content nor purpose of research. We may call this ‘contest illusion’. This contest
illusion was applied to science in England for the first time under the Thatcher
government in the 1980s. Afterwards it was quickly copied in other countries. The
Thatcher government, inspired by its belief in markets and competition, would
have loved to privatize all institutions engaged in academic activities and to let
markets decide which kind of science was needed, and which was not. However,
this proved to be impossible. Basic research constitutes, for the most part, a
common good which cannot be sold for profit at a market. Privatization would
therefore completely wipe out basic research. Thus, artificially staged competitions
were created, which were then termed markets (internal markets, pseudo-markets),
even though this was false labeling.
Connected to the euphoria about markets and competition, there was also a
deep mistrust towards independent research taking place within ‘‘ivory towers’’,
the purpose of which politicians often do not understand. What does the search for
knowledge bring apart from high costs? On these grounds, the former British
minister of education Charles Clarke characterized ‘‘the medieval search for truth’’
as obsolete and unnecessary.1 Modern universities should produce applicable
knowledge, which can be transformed into growth of the gross domestic product,
and additionally make it more sustainable. Universities should think ‘‘entrepre-
neurial’’ and adjust to economic needs (see Maasen and Weingart 2008). For this
reason, governments in many countries, particularly in the EU, started to organize
gigantic research programs. Instead of making research funds directly available to
universities, they are now in competition with each other, so that only the ‘‘best’’
get a chance. This should ensure that above all practice-oriented and applicable
knowledge is created and government funds are not wasted (e.g. for ‘‘unneces-
sary’’ basic research). Hence universities are forced to construct illusionary worlds
of utility and pretend that all research serves an immediate purpose (Körner 2007).
How can you impress the research commissions responsible for the distribution
of funds? This is mainly achieved by increasing measurable output such as pub-
lications, projects funded by third-party funds, and networks with other institutes
and universities. In this way, ‘‘excellence’’ is demonstrated, in turn leading to
easier access to further government research funds. Competitiveness has therefore
become a priority for universities and their main goal is to perform as highly as
possible in measurable indicators which play an important role in these artificially
staged competitions. The underlying belief is that our knowledge increases pro-
portionally to the amount of scientific projects, publications, and intensity of
networking between research institutions, which in turn is supposed to lead to
more progress and wealth. This naïve ton ideology is widespread among politi-
cians and bureaucrats.
1 BBC News. Clarke questions study as ‘adornment’: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
education/3014423.stm
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The modern university is only marginally concerned with gaining knowledge,
even though the public from time to time is assured that this is still the major goal.
Today’s universities are, on the one hand, fundraising institutions, determined to
receive as many research funds as possible. On the other hand, they are publication
factories, trying to maximize their publication output. Hence, the ideal professor is
a mixture of fundraiser, project manager, and mass publisher (either directly as
author, or as co-author in publications written by employees of the institution),
whose main concern is measurable contribution to scientific excellence, rather than
increasing our knowledge. Moreover, in order to make professors deliver their
contribution to excellence, faculty managers have been recruited for each
department in addition to traditional deans. Nowadays, the principal is sort of a
CEO who is supposed to implement new strategies for achieving more and more
excellence. Research becomes a means in the battle for ‘‘market shares’’ of uni-
versities and research institutions (Münch 2009).
Universities which on the surface expose themselves as great temples of sci-
entific excellence, are forced to participate in project- and publication-olympics,
where instead of medals, winners are rewarded with the elite or excellence status,
exemption from teaching duties, and sometimes also with higher salaries. This is
how it goes, even though many of the projects and publications do not have the
slightest importance for the rest of the population outside the academic system.
Two artificially staged competitions in particular incentivize the production of
nonsense: the competition for the highest amount of publications and the com-
petition for the highest amount of research funding. The resulting indicators for
publications and third-party funds play a central role in today’s research rankings,
such as, for example the German CHE Research Ranking of German universities
(see Berghoff et al. 2009).
The competition for the highest amount of publications will be analyzed below
in more detail. On the basis of the competition for publications, it can be nicely
demonstrated how perverse incentives emerge and what consequences this entails
not only for research, but also generally for society and the economy.
The Competition for Publications in Academic Journals:
The Peer-Review Process
In almost every academic discipline, publications are the most important and often
the only measurable output. Indeed, in some natural sciences and in engineering
inventions or patents also play a certain role, yet this more concerns applied
science. Basic research, however, always manifests itself in publications. What is
more obvious than measuring a scientist or institute’s output or productivity on the
basis of publications? For is it not the case that many publications are the result of
a lot of research, consequently increasing our relevant knowledge? Should not
every scientist be driven to publish as much as possible in order to achieve
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maximum ‘‘scientific productivity’’? Someone who has just a little knowledge of
universities and academic life can immediately answers these questions with an
overwhelming ‘‘no’’. Indeed, more publications increase the amount of printed
sheets of paper, but this number does not say any more about the significance of a
scientist or institute’s research activity than the number of notes played says about
the quality of a piece of music.
Of course, measurements of scientific output are not as primitive as counting
every written page of scientific content as scientific activity. Relevant publications
are in professional journals, where submitted work is subjected to a ‘‘rigorous’’ and
‘‘objective’’ selection method: the so-called ‘‘peer-review process’’. This should
ensure that only ‘‘qualitatively superior’’ work is published, which then is regarded
as a ‘‘real scientific publication’’. Thus, strictly speaking, the aim of the artificially
staged competitions amongst scientists is to publish as many articles as possible in
peer-reviewed scientific journals.
However, among scientific journals strict hierarchies also exist which are
supposed to represent the average ‘‘quality’’ of the accepted papers. In almost
every scientific discipline there are a few awe-inspiring top-journals (A-journals),
and then there are various groups of less highly respected journals (B- and C-
journals), where it is easier to place an article, but where the publication does not
have the same significance as an A-journal article. Publishing one’s work in an A-
journal is therefore the most important and often also the only aim of modern
scientists, thus allowing them to ascend to the ‘‘Champions’ League’’ of their
discipline. Belonging to this illustrious club makes it easier to publish further
articles in A-journals, to secure more research funds, to conduct even more
expensive experiments, and, therefore, to become even more excellent. The ‘‘Taste
for Science’’, described by Merton (1973), which is based on intrinsic motivation
and supposed to guide scientists was replaced by the extrinsically motivated
‘‘Taste for Publications.’’
But what is actually meant by the peer-review process? When a scientist wants
to publish a paper in an accepted scientific journal, the paper has to be submitted to
the journal’s editors, who have established themselves as champions within their
disciplines. These editors usually do not have the time to deal with the day-to-day
business of ‘‘their journal’’ and thus there is a less accomplished Managing Editor,
who is responsible for administrative tasks and receives manuscripts from the
publishing-hungry scientists and then puts the peer-review process in motion. The
Managing Editor gives the submitted manuscripts to one or several professors or
other distinguished scientists (the so-called peers) who ideally work in the same
field as the author and therefore should be able to assess the work’s quality.
To ensure the ‘‘objectivity’’ of the expert judgments, the assessment is usually
performed as a double-blind procedure. This means that the reviewers do not know
who are the authors of the article to be reviewed, and the authors are not told by
whom their paper is assessed. At the end of the peer review process, the reviewers
inform the editor in writing whether they plead for acceptance (very rare), revi-
sion, or rejection (most common) of the article submitted to the journal in ques-
tion. Quite a few top journals pride themselves on high rejection rates, supposedly
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reflecting the high quality of these journals (Fröhlich 2007). For such journals the
rejection rates amount to approximately 95 %, which encourages the reviewers to
reject manuscripts in almost all cases in order to defend this important ‘‘quality
measure’’. Solely manuscripts that find favor with their reviewers get published,
because although the final decision concerning publication rests with the editors,
they generally follow the expert recommendations.
The peer-review process is thus a kind of insider procedure (also known as clan
control, Ouchi 1980), which is not transparent for scientists outside the established
circle of champions. The already-established scientists of a discipline evaluate
each other, especially newcomers, and decide what is worthy to be published.
Although the claim is made that scientific publications ultimately serve the general
public, and thereby also serve people who are not active in research, the general
public, who is actually supposed to stand behind the demand for scientific
achievement, has no influence upon the publication process. The peers decide on
behalf of the rest of mankind, since the public can hardly assess the scientific
quality of a work.2 Outside of the academic system, most people neither know
what modern research is about, nor how to interpret the results and their potential
importance to mankind. Although scientists often also do not know the latter, they
are—in contrast to the layman—educated to conceal this lack of knowledge
behind important sounding scientific jargon and formal models. In this way, even
banalities and absurdities can be represented as A-journal worthy scientific
excellence, a process laymen and politicians alike are not aware of. They are kept
in the blissful belief that more competition in scientific publication leads to ever-
increasing top performance and excellence.
Considering the development of the number of scientific publications, it seems
that scientists are actually accomplishing more and more. Worldwide, the number
of scientific articles, according to a count conducted by the Centre for Science and
Technology Studies at the University of Leiden (SBF 2007) has increased enor-
mously. The number of scientific publications in professional journals worldwide
increased from approximately 686,000 in 1990 to about 1,260,000 in 2006, which
corresponds to an increase of 84 %. The annual growth rate calculated on this
basis was more than 5 %. The number of scientific publications grows faster than
the global economy and significantly faster than the production of goods and
services in industrial countries, from where the largest number of publications
originates (OECD 2008).
By far the largest share of world production of scientific articles comes from the
U.S. (25 %), followed by Britain with 6.9 %. Germany produces 6.3 %,
Switzerland 1.5 %, and Austria 0.7 % (SBF 2007). However, calculating pub-
lished articles per capita, Switzerland becomes the world’s leading country,
2 In the language of economics, this means that the information asymmetry between scientists
and lay people is so large that ‘‘monitoring’’ by outsiders is no longer possible (Partha and David
1994, p. 505).
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because there are 2.5 published scientific articles per 1,000 inhabitants, while in
the U.S. there are 1.2 articles, and only one article in Germany (SBF 2007).3 The
same picture emerges if one applies the number of publications to the number of
researchers. In this case, in Switzerland for each 1,000 researchers there are 725
publications while there are 295 in Germany and 240 in the United States. Thus, in
no other country in the world are more research publications squeezed out of the
average researcher than in Switzerland.
Once we begin to examine the background of this increasing flood of publi-
cations it quickly loses its appeal. This is to a large extent inherent in the peer-
review process itself. This supposedly objective system for assessing the quality of
articles in reality rather resembles a random process for many authors (Osterloh
and Frey 2008). A critical investigation reveals a number of facts that funda-
mentally question the peer-review process as a quality assurance instrument (cf.
Atkinson 2001; Osterloh and Frey 2008; Starbuck 2006). It generally appears that
expert judgments are highly subjective, since the consensus of several expert
judgments is usually low. One reason is that by no means do all peers, who are
mostly preoccupied with their own publications, actually read, let alone under-
stand, the articles to be evaluated. Time is far too short for this and usually it is not
even worth it because there are much more interesting things to do. Hence, time
after time reviewers pass on the articles to their assistants who, in the manner of
their boss, draft the actual review as ghostwriters (Frey et al. 2009). No wonder
that under such conditions important scientific contributions at hindsight are fre-
quently rejected. Top journals repeatedly rejected articles that later on turned out
to be scientific breakthroughs and even won the Nobel Prize. Conversely, however,
plagiarism, fraud and deception are hardly ever discovered in the peer review
process (Fröhlich 2007). In addition, unsurprisingly, reviewers assess those articles
that are in accordance with their own work more favorably, and vice versa, they
reject articles that contradict them (Lawrence 2003).
Due to the just-described peer-review process, the competition for publication
in scientific journals results in a number of perverse incentives. To please the
reviewers, a potential author undertakes everything conceivably possible. To
describe this behavior Frey (2003) rightly coined the term ‘‘academic prostitu-
tion’’, which—in contrast to traditional prostitution—does not spring from natural
demand, but is induced by artificially staged competition (cf. Giusta et al. 2007). In
particular, the following perverse effects can be observed:
Modes of perverse behavior caused by the peer-review process:
3 Nevertheless, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung already worried in an article from 2004 that the growth
of publications in Switzerland compared to the average of OECD countries was below average.
This thinking reveals once again a naive ton ideology, in which more scientific output is equated
with more well-being.
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• Strategic citing and praising4
When submitting an article to a journal, the peer-review process induces authors
to think about possible reviewers who have already published articles dealing
with the same or similar topics. To flatter the reviewers, the author will pref-
erably quote all of them or praise their work (as a seminal contribution, inge-
nious idea, etc.); An additional citation is useful for the potential reviewer
because in turn it is improving his own standing as a scientist. Furthermore,
editors often consult the bibliography at the end of an article while looking for
possible reviewers, which makes strategic citing even more attractive.
Conversely, an author will avoid criticizing the work of possible reviewers, as
this is a sure road to rejection. Accordingly, this attitude prevents the criticism
and questioning of existing approaches. Instead, the replication of established
knowledge gets promoted through elaboration upon preexisting approaches
through further model variations or additional empirical investigations.
• No deviation from established theories
In any scientific discipline there are some eminent authorities who dominate
their field and who often at the same time are the editors of top journals. This in
turn allows them to prevent the appearance of approaches or theories that
question their own research. Usually this is not difficult, since most authors try
to adapt to the prevailing mainstream theories in their own interest. The majority
of the authors simply wants to publish articles in top journals, and this makes
them flexible in terms of content. They present traditional or fashionable
approaches that evoke little protest (Osterloh and Frey 2008). In this way, some
disciplines (e.g. economics) have degenerated into a kind of theology where
heresy is no longer tolerated in established journals. Heresy takes place in only a
few marginal journals specializing in divergent theories, but these publications
rarely contribute to the reputation of a scientist. As Gerhard Fröhlich aptly
writes: ‘‘In science as in the Catholic Church similar conditions prevail: cen-
sorship, opportunism and adaptation to the mainstream of research. As a result, a
highly stylized technocratic rating- and hierarchy-system develops, which hin-
ders real scientific progress.’’
In empirical studies, the adherence to established theories can also be discovered
by the results of statistical tests. To falsify an existing theory is linked to low
chances of publication and thus there is an incentive to only publish successful
tests and to conceal negative results (Osterloh and Frey 2008).
• Form is more important than content
Since presenting original content usually lowers the chances of publication,
novelty has shifted to the form how content is presented. Simple ideas are blown
up into highly complex formal models which demonstrate the technical and
mathematical expertise of the authors and signal importance to the reader. In
many cases, the reviewers are not able to evaluate these models because they
4 In the meantime, there are now so-called guides along the lines of ‘‘How to publish
successfully?’’, which provide strategic advice to young scientists in the manner described herein.
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have neither the time nor the inclination to deal with these models over several
days. Since they cannot admit this, in a case of doubt formal brilliance is
assessed positively because it usually supports prevailing theories. It helps to
immunize the prevailing theories against criticism from outside, and all col-
leagues who are not working within the same research field just need to believe
what was ‘‘proven to be right’’ in the existing model or experiment.
With this formalization, sciences increasingly move away from reality as false
precision is more important than actual relevance. The biologist Körner writes
(2007, p. 171): The more precise the statement [of a model], the less it usually
reflects the scale of the real conditions which are of interest to or available for
the general public and which leads to scientific progress.
The predominance of form over content (let us call this ‘crowding-out’ of form
by content) does also attract other people to science. The old type of an often
highly unconventional scientist who is motivated by intrinsic motivation is
increasingly being replaced by formally gifted, streamlined men and women,5
who in spite of their formal brilliance have hardly anything important to say.
• Undermining of anonymity by expert networks
In theory, the peer-review process should work in such a way that publication
opportunities are the same for all authors. Both the anonymity of the authors and
the reviewers are guaranteed thanks to the double-blind principle. For many
established scientists at top universities, ‘‘real’’ competition under these con-
ditions would be a nuisance. After all, why did one work hard for a lifetime only
to be subject to the same conditions as any newcomer? The critical debate on the
peer-reviewed process discussed in the journal Nature in 2007, however, clearly
showed that in practice the anonymity of the process for established scientists is
rare. They know each other and know in advance which papers by colleagues or
by scientists associated with them will be submitted. In expert networks
maintained in research seminars, new papers are presented to each other, which
successfully undermines the anonymity of the peer-review process.
This fact can clearly be seen when looking at the origin of scientists who publish
in top journals. For example, a study of the top five journals in economics (Frey
et al. 2009, p. 153) shows that of the 275 articles published in 2007, 43 %
originated from scientists working at only a few top American universities
(Harvard, Yale, Princeton, MIT, Chicago, Berkeley, Stanford). The professors
of these universities are basically set as authors and the rest must then go
through an arduous competition for the few remaining publication slots. What
George Orwell noted in his book ‘‘Animal Farm’’ can be paraphrased: All
authors are equal but some are more equal than others.
5 Just look at today’s photos of highly praised young talents in sciences. In this case, images
often say more than 1,000 words.
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• Revenge of frustrated experts
Ultimately, the entire publication process is a tedious and humiliating experi-
ence for many researchers. Constantly, submitted papers are rejected, and often
for reasons that are not comprehensible. One has to be pleased if the reviewers
have the grace to make recommendations for a revision of the article. In this
case, in order to finally get it published, one needs to (or in fact ‘‘must’’) change
the article according to the wishes of the reviewers. This is hardly a pleasant
task as it is not uncommon that a revision is done ‘‘contre coeur.’’ Therefore it is
no wonder that many reviewers are at the same time frustrated authors, who can
now pay back to innocent third authors the humiliation they had gone through
themselves (Frey et al. 2009, p. 153): They should not have it easier than us, and
they should not think that getting a publication is so easy. is the tenor. For this
reason, articles are often rejected out of personal grudges, and the supposedly
objective competition for publication becomes a subjective statement. This is
particularly the case when it comes to approaches that are hated by the reviewers
(in reality it is often the professor behind the publication who is hated) and they
will not forgo the chance to make the life of this author a little bit more
miserable.
The perverse incentives created by the peer-review process ensure that the
steadily increasing number of published articles in scientific journals often does
not lead to new or original insights and, therefore, many new ideas do not show up
in established journals. They can rather be found in books and working papers,
where there is no pseudo-quality control which hinders innovative ideas. Although
the peer-review process prevents the publication of obvious platitudes and non-
sense on the one hand, on the other hand it promotes the publication of formally
and verbally dressed-up nonsense. The increasing irrelevance of content is the
result of artificially staged competition for publication in professional journals.
The next section deals with the use of publications and citations as indicators for
the assessment of individual scientists and scientific institutions, and explains why
we have more and more irrelevant publications.
The Competition for Top-Rankings by Maximising
Publications and Citations
Despite the great difficulties involved in publishing articles in professional jour-
nals, the number of publications is constantly growing because more and more
journals exist simultaneously. These publications are important for the rankings of
individual scientists as well as institutions and universities. Furthermore, if young
scientists apply for a professorship, the list of publications is usually the most
important criterion in the decision process of who will get the post. No wonder that
scientists do everything to publish as much as possible despite the painstaking
peer-review process. The question as to what to publish, where, and with whom
Excellence by Nonsense: The Competition for Publications in Modern Science 59
has become essential to the modern scientist. Publication problems cause sleepless
nights and the acceptance of an article in a top journal is the greatest thing that can
happen in the life of a modern scientist. This is the case, although most of these
publications are not of the slightest importance for anybody outside of the aca-
demic system. In most articles the opposite of what has been ‘‘proved’’ could also
be ‘‘proved’’ and it would not change the course of the world at all.
How does the number of publications actually get into the evaluation and
ranking process of scientists and their institutions? At first glance, this seems quite
simple: one simply counts all the articles published by a scientist in scientific
journals (or counts number of pages) and then gets to the relevant number of the
scientist’s publication output. However, there is a problem. As we have already
seen, the journals differ dramatically in terms of their scientific reputation, and an
article in an A journal is worth much more than an article in a B or C journal. So
we must somehow take into account the varying quality of the journals in order to
achieve a ‘‘fairly’’ assessed publication output. To this end, an entirely new science
has developed, called scientometrics or bibliometrics, which deals with nothing
else than measuring and comparing the publication output of scientists. This sci-
ence has by now obtained its own professors and its own journals, and conse-
quently the measurements are also becoming more complex and less transparent,
which then in turn justifies even more bibliometric research.
The most important tool of bibliometric research is citation analysis, which has
the purpose of determining the quantity of citations of the specific journal article to
be analyzed. Based on this, the effect of scientific articles can be ascertained. The
rationale behind this is simple: whoever is much quoted is read often, and what is
often read must be of high quality. Hence, the quantity of citations can be used as a
‘‘quality indicator’’ of an article. This quality indicator can then be used to weigh
up the articles published in various magazines. Thus, we obtain an ‘‘objective’’
number for a scientist’s publication output which then can be easily compared and
used for rankings. This is also done on a large scale and university administrators
seem to put more energy and effort into these comparisons than into actual
research.
The International Joint Committee on Quantitative Assessment of Research,
consisting of mathematicians and statisticians, talks in a report dated 2008 (Adler
et al. 2008, p. 3) about a Culture of Numbers and sums up the assessment of the
situation as follows:
The drive towards more transparency and accountability in the academic world has created
a ‘culture of numbers’ in which institutions and individuals believe that fair decisions can
be reached by algorithmic evaluation of some statistical data; unable to measure quality
(the ultimate goal), decision-makers replace quality by numbers that they can measure.
(…) But this faith in the accuracy, independence, and efficacy of metrics is misplaced.
This is a warning coming from experts, which we should take seriously. Also,
the German Research Foundation (DFG 2002) warned a few years ago about
believing too much in quantitative measures (translated by the author):
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Quantitative indicators are comfortable, they seem objective and are (…) surrounded by an
aura of hardly disputable authority. Nevertheless, the naive trust in numbers is a fatal
misbelief which each faculty (…) should counteract.
However, the similarities between various publication rankings are low because
different quality measurements lead to very different results (see e.g., Frey and
Rost 2010; Maasen and Weingart 2008). However, ‘‘clever’’ researchers have
found a solution even to that problem (see Franke and Schreier 2008). If rankings
do not lead to clear results, we should simply calculate a weighted average from
the different rankings. In other words, we construct a meta-ranking out of all
existing rankings and again we have a clear result. And if in future several meta-
rankings should exist, then one can also construct a meta-meta-ranking! Academic
excellence at its best!
A measure which has become particularly popular among number-fetishists is
the so-called ‘‘Impact Factor’’. This factor is widely used nowadays in order to
calculate the ‘‘quality’’ of journals. The Impact Factor of a particular journal is a
quotient where the numerator is the number of citations of articles published in
that particular journal during previous years (mostly over the last two years) in a
series of selected journals in a given year. The denominator comprises of the total
number of articles published in that journal within the same period of time. For
example, if a journal has an Impact Factor of 1.5 in 2010, this tells us that papers
published in this journal in 2008 and 2009 were cited 1.5 times on average in the
selected journals in 2010.
The Impact Factors used in science today are calculated annually by the
American company Thomson Scientific; these then get published in the Journal
Citation Reports. Thomson Scientific has a de facto monopoly for the calculation
of impact factors, although the exact calculation is not revealed, which has been
questioned repeatedly (see, e.g. Rossner et al. 2007). The sciences have allowed
Thomson Scientific to dominate them. (Winiwarter and Luhmann 2009, p. 1). This
is even more absurd if, on the one hand, the blessing of competition keeps being
praised, but on the other hand, a monopoly for Thomson Scientific is allowed,
which enables Thomson Scientific to sell its secretly fabricated Impact Factors to
academic institutions at a high price, although in many sciences less than 50 % of
today’s existing scientific journals are included in the calculation.
A concrete example will show how numbers are fabricated mindlessly. The
following proposal is from a 2005 research paper published by the Thurgau
Institute of Economics at the University of Konstanz. The author, Miriam Hein
(who studied economics) naively propagates a method for measuring quality
without being aware of the perverse incentives that this would create. In the
introduction we read (Hein 2005, p. 3):
An intended increase in research performance can probably be induced only by the use of
incentive-compatible management tools. Research units and individual researchers who
undertake high quality research must [an imperative!] be rewarded, and those who are less
successful, should be sanctioned. It is therefore important to identify good and bad
research. Well-designed ranking tools can serve this purpose.
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The above-quoted section talks about ‘‘high quality research’’ within the same
article and a few pages later a proposal for the measurement and calculation of the
quality of research follows. The average ‘‘quality research’’ (DQ) of an institution















Pki stands for the number of pages in publication k of scientist i, n denotes the
number of authors of the publication k, and wk is a quality factor for the article k,
which is typically the impact factor of the journal, in which the article was pub-
lished. Therefore, the numerator shows the quality-weighted research output (FX)
and the denominator simply consists of the number of published pages (FXS). The
content of an article, on the other hand, plays no role! The important thing is how
long the article is and where it got published. Nevertheless, the just described
‘‘quality measure’’ is seriously praised as progress in quality measurement. The
scientist is treated like a screw salesman: The more screws he has sold, the better
he is. This attitude is already obvious from the term ‘‘research productivity’’,
which according to Hein (2005, p. 24) is an absolutely central unit of measure in
research management. Thus, pages published in scientific journals become ends in
themselves.
The competition for top rankings established by the requirement for as many
publications and citations as possible and the already perverse incentives due to
the peer-review process have induced a great deal of perverse behavior among
scientists. In particular, the following trends can be observed:
• Salami tactics
Knowing that the ultimate goal is to maximize research output, researchers are
trying to make as much out of very little and apply so-called ‘‘salami tactics’’.
New ideas or records are cut as thin as salami slices in order to maximize
number of publications (Weingart 2005). Minor ideas are presented in complex
models or approaches in order to fill up an entire article. As a consequence,
further publications can be written by varying these models and approaches. No
wonder that in average the content of these papers gets increasingly irrelevant,
meaningless, and redundant. Hence, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find
new and really interesting ideas in the mass of irrelevant publications.
The most extreme form of a Salami tactic is to publish the same result twice or
even more often than that. Such duplication of one’s own research output is of
course not allowed, but in reality proves to be an entirely effective way to
increase one’s research productivity. As we have seen above, the peer-review
process often fails to discover such double publications. Therefore, an anony-
mous survey on 3,000 American scientists from the year 2002 shows, at least
4.7 % of the participating scientists admitted to have published the same result
several times (Six 2008).
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• Increase of the number of authors per article
It can be observed that the number of authors publishing articles in scientific
journals has largely increased over the recent decades. For example, in the
Deutsche Ärzteblatt the average number of authors per article has risen from 1
author per article in 1957 to 3.5 in 2008 (see Baethge 2008). This is, on the one
hand, due to the fact that experiments in particular have become increasingly
complex and that experiments are no longer carried out by a single scientist, but
rather by a team. An evaluation of international journals showed that today’s
average number of authors per article in modern medicine is 4.4, which is the
highest number; this is followed by physics with 4.1 authors per article. In
psychology, the average is 2.6 authors per article, while in philosophy, a field
still free of experiments, the average number of authors of an article is 1.1
(Wuchty et al. 2007).
However, the increase in team research is not the only reason for the constant
increase of authors per article. On the other hand, there is the incentive to
publish as much as possible and to be cited as often as possible. So, especially
those who have some power in the academic hierarchy (professors or project
leaders) try to use their power by forcing all team members to include them as
authors in all publications of their research team. And the larger the team, the
more publications with this kind of ‘‘honorary authorship’’ are possible. Con-
versely, it may also be attractive to young scientists to include a well-known
professor as a co-author because—thanks to the dubious nature of anonymity
within the peer-review process—this improves the chances of publication (see
above).
Instead of ‘‘honorary authorship’’ it would be also appropriate to speak of
‘‘forced co-authorship’’, as Timo Rager wrote in a letter to editor of the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung at the end of 2008. There we read: [Forced co-authorship] …
exists even at prestigious institutions at the ETH and at Max-Planck institutes. If
you protest against it, you are risking your scientific career. So in addition to the
real authors of scientific articles there are more and more phantom authors, who
did not actually contribute to an article, but want to increase the number of their
publications. In medicine, this trend appears to be particularly prevalent, which
also explains why the average number of authors per article in modern medicine
is so high. Based on the articles published in 2002, every tenth name in the
author list of the ‘‘British Medical Journal’’ and one in five in the ‘‘Annals of
Internal Medicine’’, were phantom authors (see Baethge 2008). Furthermore,
60 % of all articles published in the ‘‘Annals of Internal Medicine’’ cited at least
one phantom author. No wonder are there clinical directors with over 50 pub-
lications per year (see Six 2008), which, if they had really contributed to all
these publications, would be beyond the capacity of a normal human being.
With the number of co-authors, however, not only the publication list of par-
ticipating authors per article is growing, but also the number of direct and
indirect ‘‘self-citations’’ (Fröhlich 2006), which triggers a snowball effect. The
more authors an article has, the more all participating authors will be quoting
this article again, especially if they are again involved as co-authors in another
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article: ‘‘I publish an article with five co-authors and we have six times as many
friends who quote us’’ (Fröhlich 2006).
• Ever-increasing specialization
To meet this enormous need for publication, new journals for ever more finely
divided sub-areas of a research discipline are launched constantly. Thus, the
total number of worldwide existing scientific journals is estimated between
100,000 to 130,000 (Mocikat 2009), and each year there are more. By getting
increasingly specialized and narrow-minded, chances for publication are
improved (Frey et al. 2009). It is advisable to be specialized in a very exotic but
important-sounding topic which is understood only by very few insiders, and
establish a scientific journal for this topic. Consequently, the few specialists
within this field can promote their chances of publication by writing positive
reviews in the peer-review process, so that they will all get published.
Let us just take the topic of ‘‘wine’’ as an example: There is the ‘‘Journal of
Wine Economics’’, the ‘‘International Journal of Wine Business Research’’,
‘‘Journal of Wine Research’’, the ‘‘International Journal of Wine Marketing,’’
and so on. All of these are scientific journals that deal with wine on a ‘‘highly
scientific’’ level, covering topics such as wine economics, wine marketing, or
sales. Probably we will soon also have specialized journals for red-wine and
white-wine economics and we also await the ‘‘Journal of Wine Psychology’’.
• Forgery and fraud
Last but not least, the whole competition for as many publications and citations
as possible leads to fraud and forgery. The higher the pressure to increase
productivity, the more likely it is to resort to doubtful means. (Fröhlich 2006).
The assumption that universities are committed to the search for truth (Wehrli
2009) becomes more and more a fiction. Modern universities are exclusively
committed to excellence and the search for truth does not help very much in this
respect. No wonder that quite a few cases of fraud have become publicly known
more recently.
A good example is the former German physicist Jan-Hendrik Schoen, born
1970, who was celebrated as the German Excellence prodigy until his case of
fraud was discovered. For some time it was believed that he had discovered the
first organic laser and the first light-emitting transistor, and accordingly he was
highly praised and received a number of scientific awards. At the peak of his
career, as a 31-year-old rising star at Bell Laboratories in the United States, he
published an article in a scientific journal on average every eight days, of which
17 were published in highly respected journals such as ‘‘Nature’’ or ‘‘Science’’.
No one seemed to notice that this is simply impossible if you do proper research.
Instead the German scientific community was proud that they were able to come
up with such a top performer. It took some time until co-researchers doubted his
results and soon the data turned out to be forged in large parts. A lot of the
results were simply simulated on the computer. The interesting thing is, as Reich
(2009) writes in her book ‘‘Plastic Fantastic’’, that these forgeries would
probably never have even been discovered if Schoen had not exaggerated so
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much with his publications. Otherwise, he would probably be a respected pro-
fessor at a top university by now and part of an excellence cluster.
Cases of fraud such as the example of Jan Hendrik Schoen mainly affect the
natural sciences, where the results of experiments are corrected or simply get
invented. Social sciences often have gone already one step further. There,
research is often of such a high degree of irrelevance that it does not matter
anymore whether a result is faked or not. It does not matter one way or the other.
The overall effect of all these perverse incentives is that scientists produce more
and more nonsense, which adds nothing to real scientific progress. In turn, because
the articles also become increasingly out of touch with reality, they are read less
and less. Moreover, the increase in citations is not a sign of increased dispersion of
scientific knowledge because, presumably, most articles get quoted unread. This
has been shown by research that documents how mistakes from the cited papers
are also included in the articles which cite them. (Simkin and Roychowdhury
2005). Therefore, more and more articles are published but they are read less and
less. The whole process represents a vicious circle that leads to a rapid increase in
the publication of nonsense. In the past, researchers who had nothing to say at least
did not publish. However, today, artificially staged competitions force even
uninspired and mediocre scientists to publish all the time. Non-performance has
been replaced by the performance of nonsense. This is worse because it makes it
increasingly difficult to find the truly interesting research in the mass of insig-
nificant publications.
Side Effects of the Production of Nonsense in Science:
‘Crowding-Out’ Effects and New Bureaucracy
The artificially staged competitions in science for publications and citations, but
also for third-party projects (financing), have caused the emergence of more and
more nonsense in the form of publications and projects. This is associated with a
variety of side effects, some of which have serious consequences. The intrinsic
motivation of those scientists involved in research is increasingly replaced by a
system of ‘‘stick and carrot’’. Indeed, this is not the only crowding-out effect that
we can observe. In addition, a new bureaucracy has evolved which ensures that
more and more people employed in the research system spend more and more time
on things that have nothing to do with true research. Both effects cause a gradual
deterioration within many scientific disciplines, but they are advertised under
labels such as ‘‘more excellence’’ and ‘‘more efficiency’’.
Crowding-Out Effects
Some of the crowding out effects triggered by competitions for publications and
projects were already previously addressed in this contribution. Here we will show
how this crowding-out effects harm universities and the scientific world.
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• Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation by stick and carrot
Carrots and sticks replace the taste for science (Merton 1973) which is indis-
pensable for scientific progress. A scientist who does not truly love his work will
never be a great scientist. Yet exactly those scientists who are intrinsically
motivated are the ones whose motivation is usually crowded out the most. They
are often rather unconventional people who do not perform well in standardized
competitions, and they do not feel like constantly being forced to work just to
attain high scores. Therefore, a lot of potentially highly valuable research is
crowded out along with intrinsic motivation as well.
• Crowding-out of unconventional people and approaches by the mainstream
Both original themes and unconventional people have little in the way of
chances in a system based on artificially staged competitions. The peer-review
process causes potential authors and project applicants in both the competition
for publication and the competition for third-party funding (their projects are
also judged by peers) to converge upon mainstream topics and approaches, as
novel ideas and approaches get rarely published or financed. However, scientific
geniuses were hardly ever mainstream before their theories or methods were
accepted. They are often quite unconventional in their way of working and,
therefore, do not perform well in assessments which are based upon the number
of publications in professional journals, citations, or projects acquired. Neither
Albert Einstein nor Friedrich Nietzsche would be able to pursue a scientific
career under the current system.
• Crowding-out of quality by quantity
In the current system, scientific knowledge is replaced by measurable outputs.
Not the content of an article or a project counts, but the number of published and
cited articles or the number and the amount of money of the acquired projects.
Since the measurable output is considered to be the indicator of quality, the true
quality is more and more crowded out. The need to publish constantly leaves no
time to worry too long about the progress of knowledge, although this should be
the real purpose of scientific activity.
• Crowding-out of content by form
Closely related to the crowding-out of quality by quantity is the crowding-out of
content by form. As content gets more trivial and inconsequential, one tries to
shine with form: With complicated formulas or models, with sophisticated
empirical research designs, with extensive computer simulations, and with
gigantic machinery for laboratories. The actual content of research drifts into the
background and the spotlight is turned on formal artistry. For example, it does
not matter anymore if comparing different data sets really brings benefit to the
progress in knowledge. Important is the sophistication of the method which was
used for the comparison of the data sets.
• Crowding-out of research by bureaucracy
This crowding-out effect makes a significant contribution to the new bureau-
cracy described in the following section. The people employed in research such
as professors, heads of institutes, research assistants, or graduate students
actually spend an ever-larger portion of their time coping with research
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bureaucracy. This obviously includes the time it takes to write (often unsuc-
cessful) research proposals, and later on interim and final reports: This is time a
researcher must spend as a price for actually participating in the project com-
petition. In this way, the actual research is paradoxically repressed by its
advancement because the administrative requirements no longer permit
research. Furthermore, each journal article submitted for publication requires an
enormous effort (strategic citing, unnecessary formalization, etc.), which has
nothing to do with its content. Bureaucracy, and not research, ultimately con-
sumes most of the time that is spent on writing scientific publications in journals
and on carrying out projects that do not contribute anything to scientific
knowledge, but have the goal of improving the measurable output.
• Crowding-out of individuals by centers, networks, and clusters
Competitions for projects also cause individual researchers to disappear more
and more behind competence centers, networks, and clusters. Research insti-
tutions prefer to pump research money into large research networks which are
supposed to provide excellence. Scientists see themselves under pressure to
reinvent preferably large cooperative and long-range projects with as many
research partners (network!) as possible, bringing third-party funds to their
institution. Large anonymous institutions such as the EU give money to other
large anonymous institutions (e.g. an excellence cluster) where the individual
researcher disappears, becoming a small wheel in a big research machine.
• Crowding-out of ‘‘useless’’ basic research by application-oriented, ‘‘useful’’
research
The competition for third-party funded projects is especially driven in this way
because it is believed to initiate more and more ‘‘useful’’ research; this will
rapidly lead to marketable innovations and further on to more economic growth.
In this way, both humanities and basic research is gradually crowded out
because in these disciplines immediate usability can hardly be shown or pos-
tulated. For example, ‘‘useful’’ brain research displaces ‘‘useless’’ epistemology.
However, anyone who is familiar with the history of scientific progress knows
that often discoveries which were considered ‘‘useless’’ at their inception led to
some of the most successful commercial applications. The at first sight ‘‘use-
less’’ field of philosophical logic has proven to be absolutely central to the
development of hardware and software for computers.
The crowding-out effects described above vary from one scientific discipline to
another, but nowadays they can found in almost every discipline. They have
become obvious to such an extent that they cannot be ignored. However, politi-
cians and managers in charge of science do not actually care about this because
they want quick success that can be proven by measurable output. In turn, young
scientists are socialized by the established scientific system in a way that the
perverse effects caused by this development already appear to be normal to them.
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The Emergence of a New Research Bureaucracy
One of the crowding-out effects that was just described concerns the crowding-out
of research by bureaucracy. From the outside, it looks just as if research activities
grow at a fast pace. There are more and more people employed at universities and
research institutions,6 the number of scientific publications increases steadily, and
more and more money is spent on research. However, the crowding-out effect
gives rise to people who seem to do scientific work, but mostly are not engaged in
research at all. Most scientists know about this phenomenon. What scientists at
universities and other research institutions are mostly doing are things such as
writing applications for funding of research projects, looking for possible partners
for a network and coordination of tasks, writing interim and final reports for
existing projects, evaluating project proposals and articles written by other
researchers, revising and resubmitting a rejected article, converting a previously
published article into a research proposal so that it can be funded retrospectively,
and so on.
It is clear that there is hardly time to do research under such conditions. Project
proposals of more than 100 pages are not uncommon today, and the application
process at some institutions has become like a maze which only a few specialists
can guide you through. An expert in this field, the sociologist Münch (2009, p. 8)
writes:
Staged competitions devour extensive stuff and resources for coordination, for application
processes, for evaluation and implementation which eat into actual research work, so that
exactly the very best researchers are falling into a newly created control machine and run
the risk of drowning in its depths.
The actual research today rests largely on the shoulders of assistants and
graduate students whose low hourly compensations still allow them to improve
scientific knowledge. In contrast, opportunity costs of doing research are often too
high for professors and research leaders, because they can contribute more to the
measurable output of their institution by focusing on the organization and man-
agement of project acquisitions and publications. In turn, because the postgradu-
ates are in fact often also forced to name their professors or institute directors as
co-authors of their publications, the list of publications of professors and research
leaders still grows despite their lack of continued research.
However, the above-described increase in the proportion of time that is lost due to
the bureaucracy associated with the artificial competitions is only the first step of the
new bureaucracy. The second step becomes evident by the ever-increasing number
of people working in governmental committees who are in charge of the
6 In Switzerland, the total number of employees at universities in Switzerland shows an increase
of 24,402 in 1995 to 32,751 in 2008, which is about one-third. Of the 32,751 employees in 2008
were 2,900 professors, 2,851 were lecturers, 15,868 were assistants and research assistants, and
11,132 people were outside of research and teaching in the administration or engineering work
(SBF 2007).
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organization and the course of these artificially staged competitions. This is essential
to both the traditional research institutions such as universities or research institutes
as well as to the committees dealing with the organization and financing of research
(European Research Council, Federal Ministry for Education and Research, etc.).
Artificial competitions have enormously complicated research funding. Universities
and their respective institutes do not directly receive money for research anymore.
Instead, they have to write proposals for government-initiated research programs,
which have to get evaluated and administered. This is a complex and time-con-
suming process in which each process is associated with complicated procedures and
endless forms to be filled out. What is proudly called research-competition becomes,
at a closer look, a labor-intensive and inefficient re-allocation of funds from some
public institutions (Ministry of Research or the appropriate Federal Agency) to other
public institutions (universities, research institutes).
The second step of the increase in bureaucracy is also due to the fact that
universities, institutes, and even professors need to be evaluated and ranked.
Numbers are needed to decide which institutions or professors are really excellent,
and where it is worthwhile to promote excellence clusters or competence networks
and what institutions can be awarded the status of a ‘‘lighthouse in research’’.
There are already several public agencies (e.g. Centre d’Etudes de la science et de
la Technology in Switzerland) and university institutions (e.g. Centre for Science
and Technology Studies at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands), which
deal exclusively with the measurement of research inputs and outputs on the basis
of bibliometric and scientometric research. There the metrics are fabricated which
are necessary for the artificial competitions and which form the basis for the
rankings and, in turn, stimulate the publication and project competitions.
Research funding has reached its far highest level of bureaucracy by the EU
research programs,7 which appear to be especially sophisticated Keynesian
employment programs. None of the ‘‘Research Staff’’ working for the EU actually
does research because inventing increasingly complex application processes and
new funding instruments already creates a sufficiently large workload for them.
Therefore, a large portion of the research is just used to maintain this bureaucracy.
Already in 1997, the European Court of Auditors criticized the EU in relation to the
4th Research Program as an ‘‘enormous bureaucracy and a useless waste of money’’.
According to experts, only about 60 % of the 13 billion euros, which were provided
to the 4th Research Program, were actually received by research institutions. Not
much has been changed in the following programs. The responsible coordinator of
the Budgetary Control Committee of the European Parliament, Inge Gräßle (CDU),
after the end of the 6th Research Program (€ 16.7 billion in 4 years), came in 2007 to
the conclusion that ‘‘the effort to simplify funding allocation within the EU research
framework program has not yet been sufficient.’’ That is an understatement. The 6th
Program has invented a whole new, previously unknown form of networking
bureaucracy, which has led to much more, and not less, bureaucracy.
7 See also Binswanger (2003).
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The increase in bureaucracy outside of the actual research institutions also
fosters an increase in bureaucracy within the research institutions. The large
number of EU-research officers has managed to complicate the application process
tremendously. In Germany alone hundreds of advisor posts have been created just
to help scientists to make a successful project application. Even if you have
completed the tedious work involved in making an application, the chance of
success is low. Since the 6th Research Program which began in 2002, the success
rate of applications lies between 15 and 20 %, while before the success rate of
applications was at about one quarter. In other words, between 80 and 85 % of
applications, involving about 12 researchers on average today, are not successful.
You can imagine what enormous amounts of time and money are here wasted just
to get funding from an EU project.
Of course, the new research bureaucracy has its positive impact on the econ-
omy. It creates new jobs and contributes to full employment. Keynes would
probably be amazed at what creative level his ideas of a national employment
policy have been developed within science. Back in the 1930s, the time of the
Great Depression, he mentioned that, in such situations, even totally unproductive
and useless activities would stimulate the economy and would therefore eliminate
unemployment. The example he gave referred to a governmental construction
project in which workers were employed digging ditches and then filling them up
again. Even if useless, such a program paid by government funds will cause an
increase in the demand for construction activities and thus stimulate the economy.
Today’s nonsense production in science is much more sophisticated than the
nonsense of digging ditches and filling them up again as the nonsense is disguised
to the general public.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
Adler, R., Ewing, J., & Taylor, P. (2008). Citation statistics. A report from the joint committee on
quantitative assessment of research (IMU, ICIAM, IMS). Available at: http://www.
mathunion.org/fileadmin/IMU/Report/CitationStatistics.pdf.
Atkinson, M. (2001). ‘‘Peer review’’ culture. Science and Engineering Ethics, 7(2), 193–204.
doi:10.1007/s11948-001-0040-8.
Baethge, C. (2008). Gemeinsam veröffentlichen oder untergehen. Deutsches Ärzteblatt, 105,
380–383.
Berghoff, S., et al. (2009). CHE-Hochschulranking. Vorgehensweise und Indikatoren. In
Arbeitspapier Nr. 119. Available at: http://www.che.de/downloads/CHE_AP119_Methode_
Hochschulranking_2009.pdf.
Binswanger, M. (2003). EU: Wie Forschungsmillionen in der Bürokratie verschwinden. Die
Weltwoche, 24, 51–52.
DFG. (2002). Perspektiven der Forschung und ihre Förderung. Aufgaben und Finanzierung
2002–2006, Weinheim.
70 M. Binswanger
Franke, N., & Schreier, M. (2008). A meta-ranking of technology and innovation management/
entrepreneurship journals. Die Betriebswirtschaft, 68, 185–216.
Frey, B. S. (2003). Publishing as prostitution? Choosing between one’s own ideas and academic
success. Public Choice, 116, 205–223.
Frey, B. S., Eichenberger, R., & Frey, R. L. (2009). Editorial ruminations: Publishing kyklos.
Kyklos, 62(2), 151–160. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2009.00428.x.
Frey, B. S., & Rost, K. (2010). Do rankings reflect research quality? Journal of Applied
Economics, 13(1), 1–38. doi:10.1016/S1514-0326(10)60002-5.
Fröhlich, G. (2006). Evaluation wissenschaftlicher Leistungen: 10 Fragen von Bruno Bauer an
Gerhard Fröhlich, Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Strahlenbiologie und Medizinische
Physik: SGSMP Bulletin. Available at: http://www.sgsmp.ch/bullA62.pdf.
Fröhlich, G. (2007). Peer Review und Abweisungsraten: Prestigeschmuck wissenschaftlicher
Journale. Forschung und Lehre, pp. 338–339.
Giusta, M. D., Tommaso, M. L., & Strøm, S. (2007). Who is watching? The market for
prostitution services. Journal of Population Economics, 22(2), 501–516. doi:10.1007/s00148-
007-0136-9.
Hein, M. (2005). Wie hat sich die universitäre volkswirtschaftliche Forschung in der Schweiz seit
Beginn der 90er Jahre entwickelt? In Research paper series. Konstanz: Thurgauer
Wirtschaftsinstitut.
Kohler, G. (2007). Über das Management der Universität. Anmerkung zu einer aktuellen Debatte.
Neue Zürcher Zeitung. Available at: http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/feuilleton/uebersicht/ueber-
das-management-der-universitaet-1.538892.
Körner, C. (2007). Die Naturwissenschaft im Spannungsfeld zwischen individueller Kreativität
und institutionellen Netzen. In W. Berka & W. Schmidinger (Eds.), Vom Nutzen der
Wissenschaften (pp. 169–181). Wien: Böhlau.
Lawrence, P. A. (2003). The politics of publication. Nature, 422(6929), 259–261. doi:10.1038/
422259a.
Maasen, S., & Weingart, P. (2008). Unternehmerische Universität und neue Wissenschaftskultur.
In H. Matthies & D. Simon (Eds.), Wissenschaft unter Beobachtung. Effekte und Defekte von
Evaluationen. Leviathan Sonderheft ,24, 141–160.
Merton, R. K. (1973). The normative structure of science. In R. K. Merton (Ed.), The sociology of
science: Theoretical and empirical investigations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mittelstrass, J. (2007). Begegnungen mit Exzellenz.
Mocikat, R. (2009). Die Diktatur der Zitatenindizes: Folgen für die Wissenskultur. Gaia, 2(18),
100–103.
Münch, R. (2009). Globale Eliten, lokale Autoritäten: Bildung und Wissenschaft unter dem
Regime von PISA, McKinsey & Co. Frankfurt, M.: Suhrkamp.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2008). OECD science,
technology and industry outlook. Paris: OECD Publishing.
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2008). Anreize im Wirtschaftssystem. CREMA Research Paper. In
Universität Zürich.
Ouchi, W. G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25,
129–141.
Partha, D., & David, P. A. (1994). Toward a new economics of science. Research Policy, 23(5),
487–521. doi:10.1016/0048-7333(94)01002-1.
Reich, E. S. (2009). Plastic fantastic: How the biggest fraud in physics shook the scientific world
(1st ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rossner, M., Van Epps, H., & Hill, E. (2007). Show me the data. The Journal of General
Physiology, 131(1), 3–4. doi:10.1085/jgp.200709940.
SBF (Staatssekretariat für Bildung und Forschung). (2007). Bibliometrische Untersuchung zur
Forschung in der Schweiz, Bern, Schweiz.
Schatz, G. (2001). How can we improve European research?
Simkin, M. V., & Roychowdhury, V. P. (2005). Stochastic modeling of citation slips.
Scientometrics, 62(3), 367–384. doi:10.1007/s11192-005-0028-2.
Excellence by Nonsense: The Competition for Publications in Modern Science 71
Six, A. (2008). Schreibkrampf unter Forschern. Neue Zürcher Zeitung am Sonntag, p. 67.
Starbuck, W. H. (2006). The production of knowledge. The Challenge of Social Science Research.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trow, M. (1997). Reflections on diversity in higher education. In M. Herbst, G. Latzel, & L. Lutz
(Eds.), Wandel im tertitären Bildungssektor: Zur Position der Schweiz im internationalen
Vergleich (pp. 15–36). Zürich, Schweiz: Verlage der Fachvereine.
Wehrli, C. (2009). Das hohe Gut wissenschaftlicher Redlichkeit. NZZ.
Weingart, P. (2005). Impact of bibliometrics upon the science system: Inadvertent consequences?
Scientometrics, 62(1), 117–131. doi:10.1007/s11192-005-0007-7.
Winiwarter, V., & Luhmann, N. (2009). Die Vermessung der Wissenschaft. Gaia, 1(18), 1.
Wuchty, S., Jones, B. F., & Uzzi, B. (2007). The increasing dominance of teams in production of
knowledge. Science, 316(5827), 1036–1039. doi:10.1126/science.1136099.
72 M. Binswanger
